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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/CIVIL PROCEDURE-TRAP FOR 
THE UNWARY: THE 2005 AMENDMENTS TO CONNECTICUT'S 
CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTE 
A "case should not be decided solely on the basis of the literal 
meaning of a word . ... When that meaning has led to absurd or 
futile results, ... this Court has looked beyond the words to the 
purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain 
meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreason­
able one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a 
whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal 
words. "1 
INTRODUCTION 
In February 2003, Lawrence Santorso was a patient at Bristol 
Hospital in Bristol, Connecticut, receiving treatment for pancrea­
titis2 and undergoing surgery on his gallbladder and pancreas.3 
During a routine x-ray, a fifteen-millimeter nodule was discovered 
in his lungs.4 Radiologists reviewed the images and noted in three 
separate reports that further examination was necessary.5 The re­
ports were added to Santorso's file and sent to the physicians who 
were responsible for his treatment.6 
In 2005, Santorso was admitted to Veterans Affairs Hospital in 
West Haven, Connecticut, for treatment of osteomyelitis7 and an 
1. Rios v. CCMC Corp., 943 A.2d 544, 553 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (dissenting 
opinion) (second omission in original) (quoting Simonette v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 338 
A.2d 453, 457 (Conn. 1973) (Bogdanski, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Am. 
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (originating this general interpretation of 
the plain meaning rule). 
2. Pancreatitis is "inflammation of the pancreas." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COL· 
LEGIATE DlcnONARY 894 (11th ed. 2004) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. 
3. Santorso v. Bristol Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 724, 724 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Osteomyelitis is an infection of the bone. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 2, at 878. 
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ulceration of his heel.8 In June 2005, during the course of treat­
ment, Santorso's physician ordered a chest x-ray.9 This x-ray un­
covered the same mass that had been discovered in 2003.)0 As a 
result, the physician obtained Santorso's records from Bristol Hos­
pital.)l A pathology report revealed that Santorso had malignant, 
metastatic squamous cell carcinoma-lung cancer.J2 Subsequent 
reports revealed that not only had the masses enlarged during the 
intervening two years, but the cancer also had metastasized outside 
his lungs to his lymph nodes and surrounding tissues. \3 Santorso 
died as a result of his lung cancer on September 17, 2007.14 
Before his death, Santorso filed a medical malpractice com­
plaint against Bristol Hospital and the physicians who treated 
him.ls On July 5, 2006, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on 
the grounds that Santorso failed to comply with General Statute of 
Connecticut section 52-190a. This statute, as amended in 2005, re­
quires anyone filing a medical malpractice claim to make 
a reasonable inquiry as permitted by the circumstances to deter­
mine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has 
been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. The 
complaint ... shall contain a certificate of the attorney or party 
filing the action ... that such reasonable inquiry gave rise to a 
good faith belief that grounds exist for an action against each 
named defendant .... To show the existence of such· good faith, 
the claimant or the claimant's attorney ... shall obtain a written 
and signed opinion of a similar health care provider ... that there 
appears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a de­
tailed basis for the formation of such opinion.16 
Failure to include the documentation required under section 52­
190a "shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action."17 
8. Santorso,42 Conn. L Rptr. at 724. 
9. [d. 
10. Id. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. 
13. [d. 
14. Obituary, Lawrence Santorso, THE BRISTOL PRESS, available at http://www. 
bristolpress.com/articles!2007 /09/18/obituariesI18826882.prt (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
15. Santorso, 42 Conn. L Rptr. at 724. These facts seem to factually support a 
claim for loss of chance of life. See Turner W. Branch, Misdiagnosis of Cancer and Loss 
of Chance, in 30 AM. JUR. Trials §§ 237,248 (1983) (stating that "if the defendant physi­
cian destroyed the victim's chance of survival, however remote, he is held liable"). 
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(a) (2007). 
17. Id. § 52-190a(c) (emphasis added). 
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Santorso admitted that he failed to attach these documents to 
his complaint, and he filed a memorandum in opposition to defen­
dants' motion, attaching the required certificate and opinion.18 Al­
though Santorso's complaint was not dismissed,19 other complaints 
with similar flaws have met a much different fate.20 
Connecticut courts have not been uniform in interpreting the 
statute. They have divided on the issue of whether claims that fail 
to include the required documentation should be dismissed.21 
Many courts take the position that the required good faith certifi­
cate and written opinion are prerequisites to a trial court's exercise 
of subject matter jurisdiction.22 As a result, these courts hold, all 
complaints lacking these documents must be dismissed because the 
jurisdictional hurdle formed by the statute bars amendment. Other 
courts take the position that potentially meritorious claims should 
not be dismissed because of failure to comply with hyper-technical, 
18. Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 724. The Certificate of Reasonable Inquiry 
that must be included states: 
I hereby certify that I have made a reasonable inquiry, as permitted by 
the circumstances, to determine whether there are grounds for a good faith 
belief that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant. 
This inquiry has given rise to a good faith belief on my part that grounds exist 
for an action against each named defendant. 
I have obtained a written, signed opinion of a similar health care pro­
vider, as defined in c.G.s. Sec. 52-184c, that there appears to be evidence of 
medical negligence, and detailing the basis for the formation of that opinion. I 
have retained the original, signed opinion, and have attached a copy thereof 
hereto, with the name and signature of the similar health care provider ex­
punged, as provided by c.G.s. Sec. 52-190a(a). 
2 JOEL M. KAYE & WAYNE D. EFFRON, CONN. PRACrICE SERIES: CIv. PRACrICE 
FORMS 101.13 (4th ed. Supp. 2008). This form must be signed by the attorney or the 
party filing the action. 
19. Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 724. 
20. See infra Part 1.C.2. 
21. See Landi v. Wertheim, No. CV065001608S, 2006 WL 2949103, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2006) (noting the split in authority as to whether failure to include the 
required certificate implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction). 
22. See Peloso v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 838, 840 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2007); Landry v. Zborowski, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 56, 58 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007), va­
cated in part by Landry v. Zborowski, No. TIDCV076000211S, 2007 WL 4105519 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2007) (vacating on reargument part of the original decision 
to dismiss the entire complaint on the grounds that one count of the complaint sounded 
in informed consent, not medical malpractice, and thus that count should not have been 
dismissed); Kirkpatrick v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 519,520 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2006); Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375, 376 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2006); Kudera v.· Ridgefield Physical Therapy, LLC, No. 
DBDCV065000993S, 2006 WL 2773651, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006); An­
drikis v. Phoenix Internal Med., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222, 225 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006). 
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though well-intentioned, pleading rules.23 These courts hold that 
the plain language of the statute does not compel dismissal of these 
complaints.24 Instead, the statute grants discretion to the courts to 
determine whether the complaint should be dismissed.25 
Though this statute was passed as a means to combat a per­
ceived medical malpractice crisis by preventing the filing of frivo­
lous claims,26 the solution to the problem, if one exists, is not 
mandatory dismissal of claims for a deficiency in pleading. This is 
too draconian a remedy for a problem that may not even exist. Fur­
ther, even if there is a need to affirmatively prevent frivolous law­
suits, mandating dismissal of all claims that lack the required 
documents unfairly limits access to justice and undermines the goals 
of the tort system. 
Part I of this Note provides a description of the evolution of 
section 52-190a. This Part explores prior interpretations, the legis­
lative history of the 2005 amendments, and how those amendments 
have been interpreted by the Connecticut trial courts. This Part 
also explores the laws of other states that have chosen to address 
their perceived medical malpractice crises through heightened 
pleading laws. Part II begins by interpreting the statute, both the 
plain language, and the legislative history. These sections conclude 
that both the statutory language and its legislative history do not 
reflect an intent to mandate dismissal of deficient complaints. Part 
III begins by considering issues of public policy. First, the statute is 
examined in light of Connecticut's goal of ensuring that cases are 
resolved on their merits, rather than dismissed on procedural 
23. See Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 726 (holding that failure to include the 
required certificate is a curable 'deficiency); see also Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 
806,808 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); Donovan v. Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 613 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2006). 
24. See, e.g., Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 726. 
25. See infra Part I.C.I. 
26. See Bruttomesso v. Ne. Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis Servs., Inc., 698 A.2d 795, 
802 (Conn. 1997) ("The purpose of the legislation is to inhibit a plaintiff from bringing 
an inadequately investigated cause of action, whether in tort or in contract, claiming 
negligence by a health care provider."). Many debate whether the United States actu­
ally is in the midst of a medical malpractice crisis. Compare Lindsay J. Stamm, The 
Current Medical Malpractice Crisis: The Need for Reform to Ensure a Tomorrow for 
Oregon's Obstetricians, 84 OR. L. REV. 283, 283 (2005) (arguing that there is a medical 
malpractice crisis), with Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio), 
Stupid: Examining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Criti­
cal to Reform, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2004) ("[T]here has never been a 
medical malpractice litigation crisis, per se. Rather, if anything, there have been cycli­
cal insurance crises throughout the years, crises that have to do more with fluctuations 
in the bond market than anything associated with medical malpractice litigation."). 
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grounds. Next, traditional notions of access to justice and the goals 
of the tort system are explored. Lastly, this Part examines the med­
ical malpractice pleading laws in other states and compares them to 
those of Connecticut. This Note concludes that the most prudent 
approach to interpreting section 52-190a is to allow amendment of 
procedurally defective complaints-dismissal should not be 
mandated. 
I. SECTION 52-190a: PAST AND CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS, 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND A COMPARISON TO 

THE ApPROACHES OF OTHER STATES 

A. Prior Interpretation of Section 52-190a 
Though section 52-190a has been amended multiple times, its 
purpose has remained consistent-to prevent the filing of frivolous 
medical malpractice claims.27 When section 52-190a was first en­
acted, the consequences of failing to include the required certificate 
were unclear.28 The statute specified no remedy. Thus, until the 
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled on the matter in 1990, it was un­
clear "whether the failure to file a 'good faith' certificate as part of 
a medical malpractice suit [was] a jurisdictional defect."29 
In 1990, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided LeConche v. 
Elligers .30 The issue confronting the court was whether the legisla­
ture intended to make the good faith certificate an additional juris­
dictional requiremenPl The court noted that, based on the 
purpose of the statute, failure to include the certificate did not de­
stroy the jurisdiction that otherwise existed.32 The court remarked 
that "[ t ]he purpose [of the statute] is just as well served by viewing 
the statutory requirement that the complaint contain a good faith 
certificate as a pleading necessity akin to an essential allegation to 
support a cause of action. "33 Any deficiencies can be addressed 
27. See Mastrone, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375; see also Bruttomesso, 698 A.2d at 802. 
28. See Albert Zakarian & Barry D. Guliano, Survey of Connecticut Tort Law: 
/990, 65 CONN. B.l. 171, 173 (1991). 
29. [d. 
30. LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1990). 
31. [d. at 6. The court noted that '''[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is the power of 
the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in 
question belong.'" [d. at 5-6 (quoting Shea v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 439 A.2d 
997,999 (Conn. 1981)). 
32. [d. at 6. 
33. [d.; see also 1 WESLEY W. HORTON & KIMBERLY A. KNox, CONN. PRACrICE 
SERIES: SUPER. CT. CIv. RULES § 10-39, at 507-08 (2008 ed.) (stating that before the 
amendment of section 52-190a, the appropriate method for attacking a failure to supply 
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through amendment.34 As a result, the court held that "in enacting 
[section] 52-190a, the legislature did not intend to make the good 
faith certificate a jurisdictional requirement."35 
Before 2005, the thrust of the issue surrounding the interpreta­
tion of section 52-190a was whether the legislature showed a strong 
intent to make the good faith certificate a jurisdictional prerequi­
site.36 Although LeConche had answered this question in the nega­
tive, the statute was amended in 2005 to add an enforcement 
provision.37 The question then became whether this addition re­
flected a legislative intent to implicate the trial courts' subject mat­
ter jurisdiction. 
B. Legislative History of the 2005 Amendment 
The 2005 amendments to section 52-190a began as Senate Bill 
(S.B.) 1052.38 Senator Louis C. DeLuca of the 32d District and 
Representative Robert M. Ward of the 86th District were the initial 
sponsors. As introduced, the bill's enforcement mechanism read: 
"[f]ailure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsec­
tion (a) of this section shall be grounds for immediate dismissal of 
the action to recover damages that alleges that injury or death re­
sulted from the negligence of a health care provider. "39 After re­
view, the Judiciary Committee revised this provision to say: "[t]he 
failure to obtain and file the written opinion required by subsection 
(a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of the action. "40 
Thus, the Judiciary Committee removed the word "immediate" 
from the statute's enforcement clause. And, it is this language that 
was ultimately enacted.41 
a good faith certificate was a motion to strike). Thus, a complaint lacking a certificate 
was not subject to a motion to dismiss. 
34. LeConche, S79 A.2d at 6. 

3S. Id. at S. 

36. See id. 
37. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § S2-190a(c) (2007). 
38. S. lOS2, 200S Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 200S), available at http://www. 
cga.ct.gov/200SrrOB/s/pdfl200SSB-010S2-ROO-SB.pdf. 
39. S. lOS2, 200S Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 200S), available at http://www. 
cga.ct.gov/200S/tob/s/200SSB-0l0S2-ROO-SB.htm (emphasis added). 
40. Sub. S. 10S2, 200S Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 200S), available at http:// 
www.cga.ct.gov/200S/tob/s/200SSB-010S2-ROl-SB.htm. 
41. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § S2-190a(c). These amendments were met with luke­
warm support. Some applauded strengthening the requirement of a good faith certifi­
cate. See, e.g., JUDICIARY COMM., STATE OF CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REPORT ON 
BILLS FAVORABLY REPORTED BY COMMITTEE, S. Substitute Bill lOS2, 200S Gen. As­
sem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 200S) (statement of Patrick J. Monahan, Vice President & Gen. 
Counsel, Connecticut Hospital Association), available at http://www.cga.ct.govI200S/jfr/ 
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Overall, the purpose of the statute remained the same­
preventing the filing of baseless claims. Representative Lawlor 
noted that the amendment "makes it much more difficult to bring a 
medical malpractice action in court. Under this requirement, an­
other medical provider would have to state, in explicit detail, his or 
her opinion that this is a meritorious claim."42 Further, Senator 
McDonald remarked that "[t]he failure to attach such an opinion 
would require the court to dismiss the case."43 
The amendments to section 52-190a were part of a comprehen­
sive overhaul of Connecticut's medical malpractice system.44 Part 
of the reform was designed to ensure that insurance companies 
would still write malpractice policies in Connecticut as many prov­
iders stated "that they were not interested in writing medical mal­
practice insurance in Connecticut unless there was significant tort 
reform."45 Yet, the main catalyst for this bill was a desire to combat 
the steady rise in malpractice insurance rates for Connecticut 
physicians.46 
s/2005SB-0l052-ROOJUD-JFR.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (stating that the Con­
necticut Hospital Association supported strengthening the good faith certificate re­
quirement). Others argued that retaining the good faith certificate was not a 
sufficiently strong reform. See, e.g., id. (statement of Dr. Jonathan G. Greenwald) 
(stating his opposition to the good faith certificate as "they are ineffective"; instead, he 
sought adoption of pre-trial screening panels). Those who claimed that S.B. 1052 did 
not go far enough argued instead that Connecticut should require pre litigation of all 
medical malpractice claims by a prelitigation panel, composed of two attorneys and two 
physicians. See id. 
42. House Session Transcript June 8, 2005, 2005 Gen. Assem. 14 (Conn. 2005) 
(statement of Rep. Mike Lawlor). Further, prior to amendment of the statute, the re­
quired good faith certificate did not need to be attached to the complaint. OFFICE OF 
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OLR BILL ANALYSIS, S. Substitute 
B. 1052,2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/ 
2005/BN2005SB-0l052-ROl-BA.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). In fact, the plaintiff 
did not need the opinion of a similar medical professional to show the required good 
faith. [d. The amendment changed this, requiring that all complaints sounding in medi­
cal negligence include a written opinion from another doctor. [d. 
43. See Rios v. CCMC Corp., 943 A.2d 544, 550 n.9 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); 48 S. 
Proc., Pt. 14, 2005 Sess. (Conn. 2005) (statement of Sen. McDonald). 
44. House Session Transcript June 8,2005, supra note 42 (statement of Rep. Mike 
Lawlor) (noting that there are many different provisions in this legislation). 
45. S. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON BILLS FAVORABLY REPORTED BY 
COMMITTEE, Bill No.: S.B. 1052 at 1 (Conn. 2005). 
46. House Session Transcript June 8, 2005, supra note 42 (statement of Rep. Mike 
Lawlor). 
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. C. The Current Version of Section 52-190a and Its Interpretation 
The 2005 amendment enlarged the scope of subsection 52­
190a(a) and added subsection (C).47 Subsection 52-190a(c) ad­
dresses the consequences of failing to attach the required certifi­
cate, stating: "The failure to obtain and file the written opinion 
required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the 
dismissal of the action."48 Connecticut trial courts have struggled 
with interpreting this section,49 and the appellate court has ren­
dered only one decision interpreting it.50 
1. The Rationale for Holding Dismissal Is Discretionary 
In interpreting the statute, some courts have held that the deci­
sion to dismiss the complaint for failure to include the required cer­
tificate is discretionary.51 For example, the court in Donovan v. 
Sowell noted that although the legislature seemed to be trying to 
make the certificate and written opinion a requirement for bringing 
an action for medical malpractice, it was not clear that the legisla­
ture was trying to make the certificate and written opinion a pre­
requisite for the court's subject matter jurisdiction.52 Though the 
statute specifies dismissal as a remedy for a defective complaint, 
[i]t does not state ... that a plaintiff's failure to comply with 
these requirements deprives the court of subject matter jurisdic­
tion, or ... that dismissal is mandatory. In other words, the lan­
47. An Act Concerning Medical Malpractice, Sub. S. 1052, Pub. Act No. 05-275, 
§ 2, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005). 
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2007). 
49. See, e.g., Landi v. Wertheim, No. CV065001608S, 2006 WL 2949103, at *2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2006) (noting the split in authority as to whether failure to 
include the required certificate implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction). 
50. See Rios v. CCMC Corp., 943 A.2d 544, 550-51 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (hold­
ing that "[t]he plain language of [subsection (c)] ... expressly provides for dismissal" of 
deficient complaints). Though the court does not expressly state that a deficient com­
plaint must be dismissed, it is implied through its quotation of Senator Andrew McDon­
ald. See id. at 550 n.9. 
51. See Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 400, 401-02 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2007); Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); 
Donovan v. Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 610-13 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006). 
52. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 611. The court stated: 
The language that the legislature used in subsection (a) suggests that the 
legislature intended the filing of the written opinion to serve as a sort of "juris­
dictional" hurdle that a plaintiff must pass in order to maintain a medical mal­
practice action. The type of jurisdiction that the legislature had in mind, 
however, is not obvious from a preliminary reading of the text of the statute. 
Id. 
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guage ... is not the type of mandatory language that can only be 
read as implicating the court's subject matter jurisdiction.53 
The court noted that Connecticut has "a presumption in favor 
of subject matter jurisdiction," and as a result, "a strong showing of 
legislative intent" is required to rebut that presumption.54 Further, 
"[e]ven when mandatory language is used in such statutes ... 'such 
language alone does not overcome the strong presumption of juris­
diction, nor does such language alone prove strong legislative intent 
to create a jurisdictional bal.' "55 In light of these principles, the 
court stated that the plain language of section 52-i90a(c) does not 
provide the required "strong showing of legislative intent"56 that 
"would implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction."57 
Continuing, the court observed that there was no other evi­
dence that the legislature intended such a result: 
The source of a court's [subject matter] jurisdiction is the 
constitutional and statutory provisions by which it is created .... 
The Superior Court of this state "shall be the sole court of origi­
nal jurisdiction [except such actions over which the courts of pro­
bate have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute]."58 
Further, the court pointed out that Connecticut trial courts tradi­
tionally have jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims.59 In the 
same vein, the court in Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc. noted 
that "the ability to sue for professional negligence is a common-law 
right given to citizens to redress their grievances in the only practi­
cal forum available-i.e. the courts. Before that right is circum­
scribed it must be absolutely clear that the legislature intended to 
curtail its exercise."60 
The court in Donovan then addressed the use of the word 
"shall" in section 52-i90a(c).61 Although the word "shall" appears 
53. [d. 
54. [d. (quoting Williams v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 
A.2d 645, 651 (Conn. 2001». 
55. [d. (quoting Williams, 777 A.2d at 653). 
56. [d. (quoting Williams, 777 A.2d at 651). 
57. [d. 
58. [d. (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Demar v. Open Space & 
Conservation Comm'n, 559 A.2d 1103, 1107-08 (Conn. 1989». 
59. [d. (quoting LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1,6 (Conn. 1990». 
60. Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 400, 401-02 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2007). Similar arguments have been used to strike down medical malpractice 
pleading statutes in other states. See, e.g., Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 866-67 
(Okla. 2006). 
61. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 612. 
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in the statute's enforcement clause and "has often been held to be 
mandatory ... its use in this section does not mandate that such a 
certificate is jurisdictional. "62 Instead, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court has articulated a test for determining whether "shall" is 
mandatory or discretionary.63 The court must examine whether the 
action to be taken (in this case dismissal) "is of the essence of the 
thing to be accomplished. "64 The court reasoned that since the 
overarching goal of section 52-190a is to prevent the filing of frivo­
lous lawsuits,65 the required certificate is not "so central to that pur­
pose that it is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished."66 
Instead, the court stated that the purpose of the statute is better 
served by treating the good faith certificate as a "pleading necessity 
akin to an essential allegation to support a cauSe of action."67 Thus, 
the court held that failing to include the required certificate is a 
curable deficiency.68 
The court then observed that this holding was consistent with 
the statutory consequences for filing a false certificate, which had 
not changed since LeConche.69 The statute provides that as a con­
sequence of filing a false certificate, the court shall impose an ap­
propriate sanctionJo The court reasoned that since dismissal would 
be a possible consequence for filing a false certificate, "it is clear 
that such a dismissal would be discretionary, rather than required 
due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction."71 The court further rea­
soned that it would be bizarre to mandate dismissal when a party 
"merely fail[ s]" to file the required certificate, but leave dismissal 
discretionary when a party files a false certificateJ2 
Other courts have held, based on the plain meaning of the stat­
ute, that a failure to obtain and file the required certificate is not a 
jurisdictional defectJ3 For example, the court in Greer v. Norbert 
62. Id. (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6). 
65. See Bruttomesso v. Ne. Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis Servs., Inc., 698 A.2d 795, 
802 (Conn. 1997). 
66. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 612 (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6). 
67. Id. 
68. [d. (citing LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6). 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 612-13 (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6). 
72. [d. at 613 (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6). 
73. See, e.g., Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806, 808 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2007). 
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examined the word "grounds" as it was used in subsection (C).?4 
The court looked at multiple definitions, and held that they all led 
to the conclusion that the court has discretion to determine whether 
a complaint should be dismissed for failure to file the required cer­
tificate.75 In light of the definitions, and the fact "that the statute 
does not say 'the action shall be dismissed,'" the court found that it 
had discretion to determine whether to dismiss the compiainP6 
2. The Rationale for Holding That Dismissal Is Mandatory 
Other courts have found that the plain meaning of the statute 
compels dismissal when the plaintiff fails to file the required certifi­
cate and opinion.?7 The Connecticut Superior Court stated that 
"[a]n application of the commonly approved usage of the English 
language to this statute surely compels the conclusion that the 
above provision requires dismissal of the case if plaintiff did not 
obtain and file any opinion at all. "78 The court noted that "[a ]ny 
other action would render the language of the statute superfluous" 
and thus in contradiction with one of the canons of statutory con­
struction.?9 In a separate opinion, the court recognized that the re­
sult, then, is that "[o]nly those cases commenced by a complaint 
with the written opinion of a medical provider attached to the com­
plaint ... may be heard and, thus, failure to attach the required 
opinion implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction."80 
74. ld. at 807. 
75. ld. at 808. The court turned to legal dictionaries, noting that Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "ground" as "[t]o provide a basis for something (such as e.g., a legal 
claim or argument)," id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 723 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S]), and that Ballentine's Law Dic­
tionary defines "ground" as "[a] point; a reason; support for a cause or action. The 
basis for taking a step in an action," id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 538 (3d ed. 1969)). 
76. ld. at 807-08. 
77. See Peloso v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 838, 840 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2007); Landry v. Zborowski, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 56, 58 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007), va­
cated in part by Landry v. Zborowski, No. TIDCV076000211S, 2007 WL 4105519 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2007) (vacating on reargument part of the original decision 
to dismiss the entire complaint on the grounds that one count of the complaint sounded 
in informed consent, not medical malpractice, and thus that count should not have been 
dismissed); Kirkpatrick v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 519, 520 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2006); Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375, 376 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2006); Kudera v. Ridgefield Physical Therapy, LLC, No. 
DBDCV065000993S, 2006 WL 2773651, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006); An­
drikis v. Phoenix Internal Med., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222, 225 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006). 
78. Landry, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. at 57. 
79. ld. at 58. 
80. Mastrone, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 376. 
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Further, some courts have held that the legislative history sup­
ports the idea that the certificate and written opinion form a pre­
requisite for the court's subject matter jurisdiction.81 The court in 
Andrikis v. Phoenix Internal Medicine 82 reviewed the legislative 
history in depth and found the following statement by Senator 
Kissel: 
[R]equiring a plaintiff to obtain and file a detailed opinion sup­
porting good faith would 'help the defense counsel and their cli­
ents right into the ballpark, right at the inception of the medical 
malpractice case ... [because it would allow] ... counsel and 
their clients [to] really narrow down exactly what was the basis 
for the determination of the basis for the plaintiff's claim that 
there was medical malpractice and why they had brought that 
case.83 
Other legislators noted during these hearings that the purpose of 
the legislation was to make bringing a malpractice claim more diffi­
cult.84 As a result of these statements, the court concluded that the 
"legislative intent indicate[s] that the requirement of obtaining and 
filing an opinion was intended as a jurisdictional hurdle for medical 
malpractice actions. "85 
After reviewing the legislative history, the court in Peloso v. 
Walgreen Eastern Co. concluded that the failure to include the re­
quired certificate and opinion mandates dismissa1.86 Great weight 
was placed on a remark by Senator McDonald that the "failure to 
attach such an opinion would require the court to dismiss the 
case."87 Given the legislature's stated goal of ensuring quick reso­
lution of medical malpractice claims,88 the court reasoned that 
"[ a ]llowing the court jurisdiction to order the plaintiff to amend his 
complaint in the face of a pending motion to dismiss would contra­
vene this goal of speedier process. "89 As a result, the court con­
81. See, e.g., Peloso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 841 n.9; Andrikis, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 
225. 
82. Andrikis, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222. 
83. Id. at 225 (quoting Senate Session Transcript June 6,2005,2005 Gen. Assem. 
(Conn. 2005) (statement of Sen. Richard Kissel, Ranking Member of the Committee on 
Aging». 
84. See id. (citing House Session Transcript June 8, 2005, supra note 42). 
85. Id. 
86. Peloso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 841 n.9. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
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cluded that it lacked the power to order amendment-it did not 
have the discretion to order any remedy besides dismissa1.9o 
This approach was essentially endorsed by the Appellate Court 
of Connecticut in Rios v. CCMC Corp.91 Though the court did not 
analyze the reasoning of the trial courts that have interpreted sec­
tion 52-190a(c), it held that the 2005 amendment overruled LeCon
che.92 In conclusion, the court held that "[t]he plain language of 
this new statutory subsection, which was not in effect at the time of 
LeConche ... , expressly provides for dismissal of an action when a 
plaintiff fails" to comply with the statute.93 
D. 	 The Approaches of Other States to Medical Malpractice 
Actions 
Connecticut is one of many states that has identified medical 
malpractice suits as a special class of actions.94 Many states require 
heightened pleading similar to that present in Connecticut.95 Illi­
nois even used identicallanguage.96 However, some of these states 
have set up a different statutory framework. 97 For example, Minne­
90. Id.; see also Kudera v. Ridgefield Physical Therapy, LLC, No. 
DBDCV065000993S, 2006 WL 2773651, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2006). 
91. 	 Rios v. CCMC Corp., 943 A.2d 544 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). 
92. 	 Id. at 550. 
93. Id. 
94. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 
(Supp. 2006); GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671­
12.5 (LexisNexis 2007); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.2912d (West 2000); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (Supp. 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 538.225 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-105 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 41A.071 (LexisNexis 2006); N.Y.C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-20.1 (2007); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1806 (2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1­
1708.1E (West 2004), invalidated by Zeier v. Zimmer, 152 P.3d 861 (Okla. 2006). 
95. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 6853; GA. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-9.1; HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 671-12.5; MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.2912d; MINN. STAT. § 145.682; MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 11-1-58; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225; NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.071; 
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 3012-a; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-20.1; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 1-1708.lE. 
Some states also require presentation of the claim to a medical malpractice review 
board or other similar body. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
18 § 6803; HAW. REV. STAT. § 671.12; MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-105; WYo. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9-2-1806. In lieu of requiring a plaintiff to find a physician willing to write a letter 
stating that there is evidence of medical negligence, these review bodies examine the 
evidence and determine whether the claim should proceed. 
96. 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/2-622 (West 2003), invalidated by Best V. Taylor Mach. 
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (holding that this statute was unconstitutional only 
because the statute would be meaningless without other statutes that were explicitly 
struck down). 
97. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.682. 
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sota, unlike Connecticut, has a demand requirement.98 Under this 
statute, the plaintiff has sixty days to produce the required affidavit 
after the defendant demands it.99 
Many states have had issues with their certificate of merit stat­
utes because defendants had begun to use them as a sword, rather 
than a shield, in an attempt to avoid liability.lOo For instance, in 
New Jersey, as a result of the dismissal of many seemingly meritori­
ous claims,101 judges have felt compelled to invoke the substantial 
compliance doctrine in order to prevent injustice.102 It would be­
hoove Connecticut courts to be aware of these problems while con­
struing Connecticut's certificate of merit statute. 
II. CONNECTICUT COURTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO DISMISS 

ALL PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT COMPLAINTS 

UNDER SECTION 52-190a 

In this Part, section 52-190a is interpreted in accordance with 
the rules of statutory construction. Section A examines the plain 
language of the statute, noting the rule in Connecticut that a strong 
showing of intent is required to create a barrier to the court's sub­
ject matter jurisdiction. This Section concludes that not only is such 
intent lacking on the face of the statute, but instead the statutory 
language affirmatively reflects an intent to give the court discretion 
in determining whether dismissal is warranted. This Section also 
analyzes the cases that conclude that the statute creates a jurisdic­
tional bar, and points out their flaws. Section B further explores 
the intent of the legislature in amending section 52-190a. First, 
early drafts of the 2005 amendments to the statute are explored. 
Next, subsection (c) of the statute is examined in light of the rest of 
the statute. Further, this Section explores the viability of prior case 
law, principally LeConche v. Elligers. Lastly, this Section explores 
the goals of section 52-190a and concludes that the legislature has 
98. Id. § 145.682(6)(a). 
99. Id. 
100. See Abbott S. Brown, The Affidavit ofMerit Mess, 163 NEW JERSEY L.J. 427, 
427 (2001); see also Melinda L. Stroub, Note, The Unforeseen Creation of a Procedural 
Minefield-New Jersey's Affidavit of Merit Statute Spurs Litigation and Expense in its 
Interpretation and Application, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 279, 279 (2002) (noting that this "stat­
ute has been a minefield for plaintiffs' attorneys with disastrous results-with one mis­
step, plaintiffs' cases have been quickly disposed of and been barred from re-filing"). 
101. Brown, supra note 100, at 427; Stroub, supra note 100, at 288. 
102. Medeiros v. O'Donnell & Naccarato, Inc., 790 A.2d 969, 973-74 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
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not manifested an intent to create a hurdle for the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
A. Plain Meaning of the Statute 
1. 	 Section 52-190a Does Not Clearly Implicate the Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction of Connecticut Trial Courts 
Connecticut requires a clear showing of legislative intent 
before a statute is read as creating a hurdle for the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction.103 Though a statute may use mandatory lan­
guage (language that compels a certain result),l°4 that language 
alone may not always provide the required showing of intent. IOS 
Speaking in the context of a statute of limitations, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court noted that, "[a]lthough we acknowledge that 
mandatory language may be an indication that the legislature in­
tended a time requirement to be jurisdictional, such language alone 
does not overcome the strong presumption of jurisdiction, nor does 
such language alone prove strong legislative intent to create a juris­
dictional bar. "106 
Facially, this statute provides little indication that dismissal is 
required for failure to include the required certificate and opinion. 
Section 52-190a(c) states that "[t]he failure to obtain and file the 
written opinion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be 
grounds for the dismissal of the action."107 The word "shall" can be 
either directory or mandatory, depending upon the manner in 
which it is used.108 Use of the word "shall" in a statute is 
mandatory when "the prescribed mode of action [(here dismissal)] 
103. Donovan v. Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 611 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) 
(quoting Williams v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651 
(Conn. 2001)). 
104. See Maitan v. Access Ambulance Co., 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 436, 437 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2007). An example of mandatory language would be "the action shall be 
dismissed." /d. This court concluded that the language in the statute, "shall be grounds 
for dismissal," was not mandatory and thus allowed for discretionary dismissal. ld. 
105. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 611 (quoting Williams, 777 A.2d at 651). 
106. Williams, 777 A.2d at 653. The Court further explained the distinction be­
tween mandatory language and subject matter jurisdiction-if language is mandatory, it 
may be satisfied through waiver or consent, two doctrines anathema to the rules regard­
ing subject matter jurisdiction. ld. 
107. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2007). 
108. LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1, 6 (Conn. 1990); see also BLACK'S, supra 
note 75, at 493 (A "directory requirement" is "[a] statutory or contractual instruction to 
act in a way that is advisable, but not absolutely essential-in contrast to a mandatory 
requirement. A directory requirement is frequently introduced by the word should or, 
less frequently, shall (which is more typically a mandatory word)."). 
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is of the essence of the thing to be accomplished. "109 Language is 
directory if "failure to comply with the requirement does not com­
promise the purpose of the statute."110 The Supreme Court of Con­
necticut applied this test in LeConche v. Elligers, holding that it was 
not satisfied. II I The Court began by noting that the purpose of the 
statute is to prevent the filing of frivolous lawsuits. lI2 However, the 
Court was unable to conclude that dismissing a claim lacking the 
required documentation was so vital to the goal of preventing the 
filing of frivolous lawsuits that it was "of the essence."l13 
Even with the 2005 amendments, the purpose of section 52­
190a has remained unchanged.114 Thus, although the legislature has 
added an enforcement provision to section 52-190a,1l5 the statute 
still must be examined in light of these authorities. The goal of the 
statute can still be achieved even if procedurally deficient claims are 
not dismissed-a trial judge can grant leave to amend. If a claim is 
baseless, an attorney should be unable to get the required certifi­
cate, resulting in the inevitable termination of the litigation.116 
However, a meritorious claim would still be allowed to proceed as 
long as leave to amend the complaint was allowed.117 
Moreover, the legislature's use of the term "grounds" in the 
statute supports the assertion that dismissal is directory, not 
mandatory. The word has been assigned definitions such as "[t]o 
provide a basis for (something, e.g., a legal claim or argument)"118 
or " [a] point; a reason; support for a cause or action. The basis for 
109. LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Var­
tuli v. Sotire, 472 A.2d 336, 341 (Conn. 1984)). 
110. Angelsea Prods., Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 674 
A.2d 1300, 1306 (Conn. 1996). 
111. LeConche, 579 A.2d at 6. 
112. [d. 
113. /d. 
114. See Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2006) (The purpose of the legislation "is to inhibit a plaintiff from bringing an inade­
quately investigated cause of action, whether in tort or in contract, claiming negligence 
by a health care provider." (quoting Bruttomesso v. Ne. Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis 
Servs., Inc., 698 A.2d 795, 802 (Conn. 1997))). 
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2005). 
116. If an attorney was able to certify a frivolous claim, that would signify a more 
fundamental flaw with the statute's relationship to its goal. 
117. See Santorso v. Bristol Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 724, 726 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2007) (holding that failure to include the required certificate is a curable deficiency); see 
also Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806, 808 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); Donovan v. 
Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 613 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006). 
118. BLACK'S, supra note 75, at 723. 
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taking a step in an action."1l9 This language does not strongly sug­
gest that the claim must be dismissed. Instead, it indicates that a 
court has a basis for dismissal when a litigant fails to include the 
required certificate. 
Further, even if the arguments above do not conclusively 
demonstrate that dismissal is discretionary, they at least demon­
strate that the statute is ambiguous. Given the presumption in 
favor of a court having subject matter jurisdiction, a strong showing 
of intent is required to deprive a court of such jurisdiction.120 Due 
to its ambiguity, the language in section 52-190a does not provide a 
clear showing of the required intent. 
In light of these definitions, interpretations, and principles, a 
working construction of subsection ( c) of the statute emerges. A 
court, if it is so inclined, can find a basis for dismissal of a complaint 
for failure to include the good faith certificate required under sub­
section (a). Under this plain meaning construction, the language of 
the statute shows that dismissal is not required. Though the court 
may consider dismissing the claim, it is not required to do so. 
2. 	 Addressing Cases That Require Dismissal Under Section 
52-190a 
a. 	 Rebutting the presumption in favor of a court's subject matter 
jurisdiction 
In Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, the court makes a 
strong argument that dismissal is required for all procedurally de­
fective complaints. l2l The court begins by stating that all "com­
plaints . . . shall have a written opinion of a medical provider 
attached or be subject to dismissal."122 Noting that the amendments 
to section 52-190a "specifically limit" the power of a court to hear 
medical malpractice cases, the court held that it is barred from 
hearing those cases that are not commenced with the required writ­
ten opinion.123 As a result, "failure to attach the required opinion 
implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction."124 
119. BALLENTINE'S, supra note 75, at 538. 
120. Donovan, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 611 (quoting Williams v. Comm'n on Human 
Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651 (Conn. 2001)). 
121. Mastrone v. St. Vincent's Med. Ctr., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 375 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2006). 
122. [d. at 376 (emphasis in original). 
123. [d. 
124. [d. 
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This textual argument is very strong. The court recognizes the 
mandatory language in subsection (c) that all complaints must con­
tain the required certificate and written opinion. Since these must 
be attached to the complaint, certainly a colorable argument can be 
made that the court lacks power to hear cases where they are not 
attached. However, this argument is not persuasive. 
A strong showing of intent is required to demonstrate the crea­
tion of a hurdle for the court's subject matter jurisdiction.125 Al­
though the court correctly observed that the statute clearly requires 
all complaints to contain the documentation required by subsection 
(a), it is not so clear that dismissal is mandated for those com­
plaints. Since the goals of the statute could still be served if these 
complaints are amended, dismissal is not essential to those goals. 
The reasoning of other courts has been more problematic. In 
Peloso v. Walgreen Eastern Co., Inc., the court stated that since 
"'[d]ismissal' refers to the action taken when a court lacks jurisdic­
tion,"126 the required opinion and certificate were "an absolute 
prerequisite for the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and ... the 
court does not have discretion in its exercise."127 This approach is 
faulty for two reasons. 
First, it overlooks the fact that the term "shall be grounds" is 
used in the statute. Though a statute that stated, "failure to include 
the required certificate must result in dismissal of the claim"128 
would clearly create a jurisdictional hurdle, this statute is far less 
clear. The court needed to analyze the term "shall be grounds" to 
arrive at this conclusion. It did not do so,129 
Second, use of the term "dismissal" in a statute does not, in 
and of itself, create a jurisdictional barrier. In reaching the conclu­
sion that the court must dismiss all deficient complaints, the court in 
Peloso stated that, as a matter of interpretation, if a statutory term 
is a legal term of art, it should be construed in accordance with its 
legal definition.13° As a result, the court concluded that since dis­
missal occurs when a court does not have jurisdiction, "[t]he weight 
125. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text. 
126. Peloso v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 838, 841 n.9 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2007). 
127. Id. 
128. See Santorso v. Bristol Hasp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 724, 726 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2007) (strongly implying that if the statute stated that dismissal was mandatory for a 
deficient complaint, it would be more likely that the statute implicated the court's sub­
ject matter jurisdiction). 
129. Peloso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 841 n.9. 
130. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1 (2007)). 
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of authority ... holds that the submission of an opinion of a similar 
health care provider is an absolute prerequisite for the court's sub­
ject matter jurisdiction, and ... the court does not have discretion 
in its exercise. "131 
This reasoning is flawed. If a statute stated, for example, that 
as a result of a pleading deficiency "the court may dismiss the 
claim," it would be difficult to argue that dismissal was mandatory. 
A judge clearly would have discretion; otherwise, the word "may" 
would be given the same definition as the word "must." This would 
be highly problematic as the two terms have separate and distinct 
meanings. Similarly, the mere fact that the legislature used the 
word "dismissal" in section 52-190a(c) does not create a jurisdic­
tional threshold in and of itself.B2 The court needed to interpret 
the rest of the statute to arrive at that conclusion; yet, it did not. 
Other cases finding that dismissal is mandatory have done so in 
a conclusory manner.!33 For example, in Landry v. Zborowski, the 
court stated that "[a]n application of the commonly approved usage 
of the English language to this statute surely compels the conclu­
sion that [subsection (c)] requires dismissal of the case if plaintiff 
did not obtain and file any opinion at all. "134 The court did not 
engage in any meaningful statutory construction.B5 Similarly, in 
Kirkpatrick v. New Britain General Hospital, the court stated that 
since it was clear that the plaintiff did not obtain the required writ­
ten opinion, the "plain and specific language of the statute" man­
131. Id. 
132. See Williams v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 
653 (Conn. 2001) (holding that use of mandatory language alone is insufficient to create 
a jurisdictional hurdle). If even the use of mandatory language does not overcome the 
strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction, surely the use of the word "dismissal" does 
not either. This is especially true in light of the somewhat ambiguous wording of the 
statute. Since the statute says "shall be grounds for dismissal" instead of "must be 
dismissed" the language should not be read as evidence of the required legislative in­
tent. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2007). 
133. See Landry v. Zborowski, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 56 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007), 
vacated in part by Landry v. Zborowski, No. CV076000211S, 2007 WL 4105519 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2007); Kirkpatrick v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 519 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2006). 
134. Landry, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. at 57. 
135. [d. The court did not analyze the statute aside from this naked conclusion. 
However, the court then engaged in statutory construction in the context of an insuffi­
ciently detailed opinion. Id. at 58. The court concluded that dismissal is mandatory for 
an insufficiently detailed opinion because subsection (c) calls for the written opinion 
"required by subsection (a)." Id. Since subsection (a) requires a detailed opinion, fail­
ure to include a sufficiently detailed opinion results in mandatory dismissal. Id. 
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dated dismissal. 136 However, the court did not break down the 
statute in reaching this conc1usion.137 
b. 	 Internal inconsistencies in cases reading section 52-190a as 
creating a barrier to subject matter jurisdiction 
Many of the courts that have concluded that attachment of the 
required documentation is a hurdle for the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction have not been internally consistent.138 For example, in 
Andrikis v. Phoenix Internal Medicine, the court found that "[t]he 
statutory language, and the legislative intent indicate that the re­
quirement of obtaining and filing an opinion was intended as a ju­
risdictional hurdle for medical malpractice actions. "139 However, 
the court held that an insufficient opinion is not grounds for dismis­
sal of the action.140 
While it seems like a prudent approach to wait until discovery 
has occurred before determining whether a written opinion is suffi­
cient,141 this approach is inconsistent with the view that a certificate 
and opinion are a threshold jurisdictional requirement.142 Subsec­
tion ( c) states that "[ t ]he failure to obtain and file the written opin
ion required by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the 
dismissal of the action."143 Subsection (a) requires "a written and 
136. Kirkpatrick, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 520. This naked assertion is all the court 
gave. Id. The court stated that because the plaintiff did not have the written opinion 
prior to filing his complaint, "this would trigger subsection (c) of the statute so that the 
court would be compelled to dismiss the complaint." Id. at 519. Although the plaintiff 
argued that there would be no prejudice to the defendant if amendment was allowed, 
the court, despite agreeing, held that it was bound by the plain and clear statutory 
language. Id. at 520. 
137. Id.; see also Grammond v. Greenwich Hosp., No. FSTCY065000533, 2006 
WL 2536596, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 16, 2006) (stating that "[t]he plain language of 
the statute requires that this court dismiss the action unless the plaintiff has submitted a 
written opinion of a health care provider" without engaging in statutory construction). 
138. See, e.g., Andrikis v. Phoenix Internal Med., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2006). But see Landry, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 56 (holding that dismissal is 
mandatory for an insufficiently detailed opinion because subsection (c) requires the 
opinion "required by subsection (a)"-a detailed opinion). 
139. Andrikis, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 225. 
140. Id. 
141. This is the majority approach. See Yicenzi v. Abbott Terrace Health Ctr., 
Inc., 44 Conn. L. Rptr. 363, 364-65 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (noting that a majority of 
the Connecticut trial courts that have decided this issue have held that the sufficiency of 
the written opinion included with the good faith certificate is not tested with a motion 
to dismiss). 
142. See Landry, 44 Conn. L. Rptr. at 57. 
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c) (2007) (emphasis added). For the text of 
subsection (a), see supra text accompanying note 16. 
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signed opinion of a similar health care provider ... that there ap­
pears to be evidence of medical negligence and includes a detailed 
basis for the formation of such opinion."144 Thus, subsection (a) 
does not just require a written opinion, it requires a detailed opin­
ion. If subsection ( c) forms a jurisdictional hurdle, it is not satisfied 
merely by inclusion of a written opinion-the opinion must be suffi­
ciently detailed. Courts are understandably reluctant to dismiss 
cases at this stage. However, if subsection (c) forms a jurisdictional 
hurdle, then all claims containing opinions of insufficient detail 
must be dismissed because they fail to meet the requirements of 
subsection (a). If the opinion and written certificate required by 
subsection (a) are a prerequisite for the court's subject matter juris­
diction, then the court lacks the discretion to state that insuffi­
ciently detailed complaints should not be dismissed. 
The court in Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc. pointed out 
the absurdities that could result from allowing the sufficiency of the 
written opinion of a similar medical professional to be challenged 
via a motion to dismiss: 
[I]f trial judges were required to treat motions to dismiss in the 
§ 52-190a context as raising subject matter jurisdiction[,] ... to 
what talisman do trial judges turn to decide whether in a particular 
case sufficient detail has been provided to show a basis for the 
malpractice action? Do we hold evidentiary hearings to decide 
the question? Do we just hear oral argument? All of this does 
not have the ring of defining an issue that should be decided on 
the basis of subject matter jurisdiction. The legislature must be 
presumed to have intended sensible results from the application 
of its legislation.145 
As a result, the court concluded that subsection ( c) does not 
implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction.146 Instead, the 
court concluded that the legislative language was meant to set up a 
"procedural rule requiring plaintiffs to provide mandatory informa­
tion or discovery at the inception of litigation without the need for 
the defendant to move for such information."147 Consequently, the 
court found that the sanction of a non-suit provides a possible rem­
144. [d. § 52-190a(a). 
145. Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 400, 401 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2007) (emphasis added). 
146. [d. 
147. /d. at 402. 
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edy, as that is one of the sanctions provided for under Connecticut's 
discovery rules.148 
This is the most logical approach. First, it allows a court to 
determine when a claim should be dismissed. Second, it avoids the 
inconsistency present in Andrikis149 by providing that the standard 
for determining whether a case should be dismissed is the same re­
gardless of whether the motion to dismiss is filed for failing to in­
clude the required opinion or for including an insufficiently detailed 
OpInIOn. 
B. Legislative Intent 
When statutory language is unclear and ambiguous on its face, 
the court must determine the legislative intent and give it effect.150 
With section 52-190a, the Connecticut legislature did not intend to 
mandate dismissal of all deficient complaints. Instead, it intended 
failure to include the required documentation to constitute a cur­
able defect. 
1. Early Drafts of the Statute 
As originally introduced, the enforcement clause of the bill 
stated that failure to file the written opinion "shall be grounds for 
immediate dismissal."151 The version that was ultimately enacted 
reads: "The failure to obtain and file the written opinion required 
by subsection (a) of this section shall be grounds for the dismissal of 
the action."152 The question becomes whether "immediate" was re­
moved for a reason. 
The legislative history contains no explanation why the Judi­
ciary Committee removed this word. This begs the question-was 
the word removed because it made an undesirable contribution to 
the statute? A court presented with a challenge to its subject mat­
ter jurisdiction must resolve the challenge before proceeding to any 
trial on the merits; thus, use of the term "immediate" in the original 
version of the statute suggests that a court must decide whether or 
148. Id. 
149. Andrikis v. Phoenix Internal Med., 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2006). 
150. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2007). This rule of statutory construction is in line 
with the approach of most other states. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCfION 46:01 (7th ed. 2007). 
151. S. 1052,2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005) (emphasis added); supra 
Part LB. 
152. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a(c). 
475 2009] TRAP FOR THE UNWARY 
not to dismiss the complaint before moving on to the merits of the 
case.153 In other words, it appears that the word created a prerequi­
site for the court's subject matter jurisdiction. As previously stated, 
the language as amended does not as clearly implicate the court's 
subject matter jurisdiction.154 If the legislature wanted to create a 
hurdle for the court's subject matter jurisdiction, enacting the stat­
ute as introduced would have accomplished that goal. This is espe­
cially true in light of the strong presumption in favor of a court 
having subject matter jurisdiction, a rule about which the legislature 
is presumed to be aware.155 Consequently, if it wanted to make a 
hurdle for the court's subject matter jurisdiction, it needed to do 
more. 
This point is reinforced after consideration of an early draft of 
subsection (a) of the amendment. Regarding the consequences of 
filing a good faith certificate in bad faith, the early version of sub­
section (a) stated in part that: 
If the court determines, after the completion of discovery, that 
such certificate was not made in good faith and that no justiciable 
issue was presented against a health care provider that fully co­
operated in providing informal discovery, the court upon motion 
or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the person who 
signed such certificate or a represented party, or both, an appro­
priate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, in­
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee. The court may also submit 
the matter to the appropriate authority for disciplinary review of 
the attorney if the claimant's attorney submitted the certificate or 
the action shall be subject to immediate dismissal pursuant to sub­
section [(d)] of this section. 156 
Though this language was not ultimately enacted, it shows that 
the legislature clearly knew how to make dismissal mandatory. The 
language states that if the matter is not submitted for disciplinary 
review, the action must be dismissed. This is different from the lan­
153. S. 1052; see also Esposito v. Specyalski, 844 A.2d 211, 218 (Conn. 2004) (ex­
plaining that a court must dismiss a case over which it cannot exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
154. See supra Part II.A.I. 
155. Considine v. City of Waterbury, 905 A.2d 70, 81 (Conn. 2006) ("[T]he legis­
lature is presumed to be aware of prior judicial decisions involving common-law rules." 
(quoting Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., 865 A.2d 1163, 1175 n.21 (Conn. 
2005))). 
156. S. 1052 (emphasis added). 
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guage adopted in subsection (c), which is more discretionary in na­
ture.157 If the legislature intended dismissal to be mandatory in 
subsection (c), it could have used the forceful language necessary to 
make it so. Its decision not to do so is indicative of legislative in­
tent, and it should be given effect.158 
2. 	 Consideration of Subsection (c) in Light of Other 
Subsections 
The penalties for filing a certificate in bad faith indicate that 
the legislature never intended for the sufficiency of the complaint to 
be measured until after discovery.159 The statute states that the 
court cannot determine whether the certificate was filed in good 
faith until after the completion of discovery.16o 
If subsection ( c) creates a jurisdictional hurdle, then, as stated 
above, the plaintiff must not merely submit a written opinion. In­
stead, the plaintiff must submit the opinion "required by subsection 
(a),"161 which requires a detailed opinion.162 However, the legisla­
ture has clearly indicated that an attorney's good faith in submitting 
a certificate is not to be measured until after discovery.163 Since an 
attorney's good faith in certifying a complaint depends on the com­
157. See supra Part II.A.I. 
158. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (" '[W)here Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of 
the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'" (alteration in the original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))). This prin­
ciple extends to legislative history. When the Connecticut legislature considered 
mandatory language and then rejected it, it should be presumed to have acted inten­
tionally and purposely. See United States v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 369 F. Supp. 1289, 
1292 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (noting that legislative intent "may be gleaned from several fac­
tors, including ... successive drafts ... of the legislation"), rev'd on other grounds by 
United States v. Union Oil. Co. of Cal., 549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1977). 
159. See Vicenzi v. Abbott Terrace Health Ctr., Inc., No. CV075004413S, 2007 
WL 3318198, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 29,2007) (noting that a majority of the Con­
necticut trial courts that have decided this issue have held that the sufficiency of the 
written opinion included with the good faith certificate is not tested with a motion to 
dismiss). 
160. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(a) (2007). The statute explicitly provides: 
If the court determines, after the completion of discovery, that such certificate 
was not made in good faith and that no justiciable issue was presented ... the 
court upon motion or upon its own initiative shall impose upon the person 
who signed such certificate or a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction .... 
Id. 
161. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a(c); see supra text accompanying notes 143-144. 
162. See id. § 52-190a(a). 
163. Id. 
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plaint's sufficiency, which can only be measured through discovery, 
the legislature could not have intended for the overall sufficiency of 
the opinion to be measured until discovery had taken place. As a 
result, if a sufficient opinion is not a jurisdictional hurdle under this 
statute, then failure to include one is not either. Rather, it is a de­
fect that can be remedied. Given the language used in subsection 
(c), it would be absurd to assume that the legislature intended ob­
taining and filing the opinion to be a jurisdictional hurdle, but not 
obtaining and filing the detailed opinion required by subsection (a). 
Such an intent does not appear on the face of the statute, nor does 
it appear in the legislative history. 
3. The Status of LeConche v. Elligers 
If the legislature wanted to unambiguously make clear that the 
required certificate was a jurisdictional hurdle, it could have stated 
that LeConche v. Elligers is overruled. LeConche was a landmark 
case that stated that a certificate of good faith is not a jurisdictional 
prerequisite. l64 Yet, nowhere in the statute does the legislature 
state that section 52-190a overrules LeConche. Moreover, the case 
is not even mentioned in the legislative history.165 
The mere inclusion of subsection (c) does not provide evidence 
of the legislature's intent to overrule LeConche. The legislature 
should be aware166 of the strong presumption of subject matter ju­
risdiction.167 This presumption becomes stronger given that "tradi­
tionally the Superior Court has had subject matter jurisdiction of a 
common law medical malpractice action."168 In light of this, the 
164. LeConche v. Elligers, 579 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1990). 
165. Cf 29 U.S.c. § 794 (2000), which was amended in 1988 specifically to over­
rule the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). S. 
REP. No. 100-64, at 2 (1987), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 3-4 (stating that the 
amendment "was introduced on February 19, 1987, to overturn the Supreme Court's 
1984 decision in Grove City College v. Bell, ... and to restore the effectiveness and 
vitality of the four major civil rights statutes that prohibit discrimination in federally 
assisted programs." (footnote omitted)). 
166. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text. While it is undoubtedly 
true that a statute rarely explicitly overrules a case, Connecticut's strong presumption in 
favor of jurisdiction requires the legislature to provide clear, unambiguous intent to 
curtail that jurisdiction. It is hard to imagine clearer intent than for the legislature to 
say "LeConche v. ElUgers is hereby overruled" at least somewhere in the legislative 
history. 
167. Donovan v. Sowell, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 609, 611 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) 
(quoting Williams v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 777 A.2d 645, 651 
(Conn. 2001)). 
168. [d. at 611 (quoting LeConche, 579 A.2d at 5). 
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legislature must show a clear intent that a jurisdictional threshold 
has been created. The legislature failed to do so here. 
Though in Doe v. Priority Care, Inc. the court concluded that 
the legislature intended to make changes to the regime set up by 
LeConche,169 the court noted that this does not necessarily mean 
that it intended to overrule that case's central holdingPO In reach­
ing this conclusion, the court examined how earlier courts had used 
legislative history in their holdings. l7l The court noted that while 
one representative recognized that the 2005 amendment to section 
52-190a "makes it much more difficult to bring a medical malprac­
tice action in court,"l72 other legislators have taken different views. 
For example, one legislator noted that the purpose of the amend­
ment was to focus on the issues in the case through use of an inde­
pendent third party.173 This purpose is still served if leave to amend 
a procedurally deficient complaint is granted.174 
It is also important to note that statements of legislators during 
the legislative process are not always indications of legislative in­
tent. Generally, "the statements and opinions of legislators uttered 
in a legislature are not appropriate sources of information from 
which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed 
by such body."175 Although the legislative history of the 2005 
amendments to section 52-190a contains a statement from Senator 
McDonald stating that "[t]he failure to attach such an opinion 
would require the court to dismiss the case,"176 this is not the best 
way to divine the legislative intent. The intent of this particular 
legislator-who did not draft this statute-is not necessarily the 
same as the intent of the legislature as a whole. This is especially 
169. Doe v. Priority Care, Inc., 933 A.2d 755, 759 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007). 
170. Id. at 755. 
171. Priority Care, Inc., 933 A.2d at 759 (examining the holdings of Andrikis v. 
Phoenix Internal Medicine, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 222 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) and Ouellette 
v. Brook Hollow Health Care Center, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 863 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)). 
172. Id. (quoting Andrikis, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. at 225). 
173. Id. 
174. A complaint amended to include the required certificate can still be used to 
identify actionable conduct. The amendment will not eviscerate this purpose of the 
statute. 
175. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 89 (2001) (citing FfC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 
643,650 (1931)). "It is true, at least generally, that statements made in debate cannot 
be used as aids to the construction of a statute." /d. 
176. Peloso v. Walgreen E. Co., Inc., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 838, 841 n.9 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2007). 
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true given that the language of the statute does not inevitably lead 
to the conclusion reached by Senator McDonald.177 
III. CONNECTICUT COURTS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO 

DISMISS ALL PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT COMPLAINTS 

UNDER SECTION 52-190a 

This Part explores why Connecticut trial courts should not be 
obligated to dismiss all complaints lacking the required documenta­
tion. First, this Part analyzes issues of public policy. The first Sec­
tion of this Part examines Connecticut's goal of ensuring that all 
cases are resolved on their merits. The next Section explores the 
negative implications of an interpretation of section 52-190a that 
mandates dismissal of all procedurally deficient complaints. This 
includes discussion of both the principle of access to justice and the 
goals of the tort system. Lastly, this Part explores common issues 
surrounding statutes similar to section 52-190a. 
A. Public Policy 
1. Ensuring that Cases are Resolved on their Merits 
As a matter of policy, section 52-190a should not be inter­
preted as implicating a court's subject matter jurisdiction. In Con­
necticut, there is 
a "policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dis­
pute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in 
court ... The design of the rules of practice is both to facilitate 
business and to advance justice ... Our practice does not favor 
the termination of proceedings without a determination of the 
merits of the controversy where that can be brought about with 
due regard to necessary rules of procedure."178 
Dismissal of claims at the pleading stage allows potentially 
meritorious claims to be decided on procedural grounds. Santorso 
v. Bristol Hospital illustrates this point wellY9 It seems fairly clear 
that Lawrence Santorso was injured because of negligence on the 
part of the hospital. Notes were placed in his file that additional 
177. See supra Part II.A.1. 
178. Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806, 807 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (quot­
ing Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 893 A.2d 371, 387 (Conn. 2006) (omissions in 
original». 
179. Santorso v. Bristol Hosp., 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 724, 724 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2007). 
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tests were needed; yet, none were performed.180 When Santorso 
filed his complaint, he failed to include the required certificate and 
written opinion.181 If the court had concluded that section 52-190a 
mandated dismissal of all deficient complaints, his claim would have 
been dismissed, and he would have been denied his day in court.182 
Such a dismissal would fly in the face of Connecticut's settled policy 
of deciding cases on their merits.I83 Due regard for the rules of 
procedure does not mandate dismissal. Instead, leave to amend 
should be granted. 
No legitimate policy aims would be served by the dismissal of 
claims similar to Lawrence Santorso's.184 Section 52-190a was en­
acted to prevent the filing of frivolous claims.18s However, dis­
missal of claims at the pleading stage does not accomplish this goal. 
It is certainly possible to have a viable claim yet not to be aware 
that additional documentation is required.186 This is especially true 
given that the statute applies to pro se litigants as well as to those 
who are represented by counsel and also does not include a demand 
requirement. Allowing a plaintiff to amend his or her complaint 
does not conflict with the goals of the statute. 
2. 	 Any Gains from a Rigid Interpretation of Section 52­
190a Are Outweighed by Negative Policy 
Implications 
Certainly, dismissing all deficient complaints would help pre­
vent lawyerly gamesmanship. This would create a hard and fast 
rule with no exceptions. A litigant who filed a deficient complaint 
would be unable to get more time to investigate his or her claim 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 725. 
183. Greer, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 807 (quoting Evans, 893 A.2d at 387). 
184. Although conservation of judicial resources is certainly a valid policy goal, 
Cavaliere v. Olmsted, 909 A.2d 52, 55 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (noting the policy of con­
serving judicial resources), allowing Santorso to amend his complaint does little to tax 
the system. Santorso was ordered to amend his complaint "to include the good faith 
certificate and the opinion of a health care professional similar to each defendant within 
a period of thirty days." Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 726. Such an action does not 
unduly burden the judicial system. Moreover, any drain on the resources of the court 
that might be relieved by mandating dismissal is outweighed by other negative policy 
implications. 
185. Bruttomesso v. Ne. Conn. Sexual Assault Crisis Servs., Inc., 698 A.2d 795, 
802 (Conn. 1997). 
186. See Santorso, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. at 724 (stating that Santorso, by his own 
admission, failed to file the required certificate and written opinion). 
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and amend later if necessary. That rule would amount to a value 
judgment-it is better to dismiss potentially legitimate claims so as 
to prevent potentially frivolous claims from proceeding. However, 
any gain that might. stem from such a rule would be offset by its 
consequences because it would require our legal system to turn a 
blind eye to principles like access to justice and the goals of the tort 
system. 
a. Access to justice 
The courts have traditionally been the place where harmed in­
dividuals can seek redress.187 However, procedural booby-traps 
such as section 52-190a form a barrier to the court system.188 The 
right to sue for medical malpractice is "a common-law right given to 
citizens to redress their grievances in the only practical forum avail­
able; namely, the courts. Before that right is circumscribed it must 
be absolutely clear that the legislature intended to curtail its exer­
cise."189 Connecticut is understandably reluctant to take the right 
to seek redress away from its citizens.19o However, interpreting the 
certificate of good faith and written opinion as jurisdictional has the 
very effect of forming a barrier to citizens seeking redress for medi­
cal negligence in Connecticut courts. 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Zeier v. 
Zimmer, Inc. struck down Oklahoma's affidavit of merit statute 
both as "an unconstitutional monetary barrier" to court access and 
as an "unconstitutional special law."191 The court found that the 
"statutorily created requirement for the payment of professional 
services as a prerequisite to the filing of a ... medical malpractice 
[ claim] violates the court access provisions guaranteed by art. 2, 
[section] 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution."l92 That constitutional 
provision provides that "[t]he courts of justice of the State shall be 
open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for 
every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; 
and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, de­
187. See Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 11 (Conn. 1975) (noting that "the right 
of redress for injury is constitutional in its nature"). This right is reflected in the open 
courts provision of the Connecticut Constitution. CONN. CaNsT. art. 1, § 10. Almost all 
(if not all) other states contain a similar provision. See, e.g., OKLA. CaNsT. art. 2, § 6. 
188. See infra text accompanying notes 191-196. 
189. Cunningham v. Talmadge Park, Inc., 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 400, 401-02 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 2007). 
190. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
191. Zeier v. Zimmer Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 862 (Okla. 2006). 
192. ld. at 869. 
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lay, or prejudice."193 The court noted that out of all possible liti­
gants, medical malpractice plaintiffs are singled out and forced to 
procure an expert opinion before there is any adjudication of their 
rights. 194 The affidavit costs anywhere between five hundred and 
five thousand dollars.195 Because of this, the court held that since 
the doors to the courthouse are closed to those who are financially 
unable to procure an affidavit, the statute creates an unconstitu­
tional monetary barrier. l96 
Article 1, section 10 of the Connecticut Constitution contains a 
virtually identical provision to that of Oklahoma.197 As a result, it 
certainly is arguable that section 52-190a violates Article 1, section 
10 of the Connecticut Constitution as well by requiring plaintiffs to 
pay for a medical opinion. However, even if this statute does not 
violate the Connecticut Constitution, it still is problematic. As the 
costs of litigation have risen, malpractice attorneys have become 
increasingly selective about the cases they take on.198 Further, be­
cause many injuries are worth less than the costs of litigating with a 
malpractice attorney, many injured parties seek relief by litigating 
pro se. Statutes like section 52-190a make it virtually impossible for 
a pro se litigant to have her case resolved on the merits. Though "it 
is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of 
pro se litigants,"199 the statute contains no exception for them.20o 
As a result, if the certificate is interpreted as a prerequisite to sub­
ject matter jurisdiction, many litigants will be denied access to jus­
tice because of this pleading requirement. 
193. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 6. 
194. Zeier, 152 P.3d at 872-73. 
195. Id. at 873. 
196. [d. 
197. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due 
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."). 
198. See Christopher S. Kozak, A Review of Federal Malpractice Tort Reform Al­
ternatives, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 599, 599 n.l (1995) (noting the increased costs of 
filing a medical malpractice suit) .. 
199. Traylor v. Awwa, No. 5001159, 2007 WL 1748189, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
June 1, 2007) (quoting Solomon v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd., 859 A.2d 932, 938 
(Conn. App. 2004)). 
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-190a (2007). 
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b. The goals of the tort system 
The two main goals of the tort system are compensation for 
victims and deterrence of negligent behavior.201 Interpretation of 
section 52-190a as creating a hurdle for the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction works against these two goals.202 
Requiring dismissal for deficient complaints denies compensa­
tion to victims as a result of a procedural technicality, not on the 
merits of their cases.203 Litigants who lack the resources to hire 
effective counselor who choose to proceed pro se risk dismissal if 
they are not aware of section 52-190a. Overall, statutes like this 
"prevent meritorious medical malpractice actions from being 
filed,"204 either because the plaintiff is unaware of the requirement 
or because they require extensive pre-trial discovery to get the facts 
needed for an expert to write an opinion.20s Thus, the injured par­
ties must overcome a significant barrier when seeking compensa­
tion for their injuries. 
If failure to include the written opinion and good faith certifi­
cate requires dismissal, then the Connecticut legislature has re­
moved a deterrent to negligent behavior. The primary mechanism 
for holding doctors liable for professional negligence is the medical 
malpractice system.206 However, if meritorious claims are dis­
missed on procedural grounds, then negligent doctors will not be 
identified. Identification of both negligent behavior and negligent 
doctors is necessary to enhance quality of patient care.207 Medical 
malpractice suits serve an important function: they place doctors on 
201. Adam J. Winters, Where There's Smoke, Is There Fire? An Empirical Analy­
sis of the Tort Crisis in Illinois, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2007) ("Most scholars 
will agree that the tort system has two primary goals: '(1) to compensate persons who 
are injured through the negligence of others and (2) to deter future negligent behavior,' 
both in the specific defendant and in others. " (citation omitted)). 
202. A contrary interpretation would allow amendment of procedurally defective 
complaints. Thus, potentially meritorious claims would be allowed to proceed to trial. 
If truly meritorious, the plaintiff would prevail and the defendant would be held liable, 
thus satisfying the two goals of the tort system. Consequently, if a claim is brought that 
lacks the statutorily required documentation, a judge should order the claim amended. 
If the plaintiff is unable to obtain certification, then the claim is frivolous and should be 
dismissed. 
203. Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 869 (Okla. 2006). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: 
Moving From Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1179, 1181 (2006) ("The medical malpractice sys­
tem is one of the major vehicles of accountability for medical errors."). 
207. Id. at 1182. 
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notice that certain conduct is actionable, and remind doctors that 
the threat of suit is always present. 
Any harm caused by allowing amendment of deficient com­
plaints is de minimis when compared to the gains created by al­
lowing claims to be resolved on their merits. The public interest in 
allowing litigants to have their day in court supersedes any ineffi­
ciency and potential for gamesmanship. Ensuring that litigants 
have access to justice furthers the goals of the tort system by al­
lowing cases to be resolved on their merits and by deterring negli­
gent behavior. 
B. The Approaches of Other States 
Many statutes address what states perceive as a medical mal­
practice crisis.208 Some statutes place caps on damages; others re­
quire presentation of a claim to a review board; and still others 
place caps on malpractice insurance.209 Many states have also 
taken approaches similar to Connecticut's by requiring certificates 
of good faith and affidavits.210 However, unlike section 52-190a, 
some of these statutes are more artfully drawn and protect the in­
terests of all parties.211 They illustrate that similar language can be 
interpreted as this Note suggests212 and show the dangers of a con­
trary interpretation.213 
1. Minnesota 
Minnesota's affidavit of merit statute requires the submission 
of two affidavits.214 First, the plaintiff'S attorney must draft an affi­
davit of expert review stating that 
[t]he facts of the case have been reviewed by the plaintiff's attor­
ney with an expert whose qualifications provide a reasonable ex­
pectation that the expert's opinions could be admissible at trial 
and that, in the opinion of this expert, one or more defendants 
208. See supra note 95. 
209. JOSEPH H. KING, JR., THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACfICE IN A NUTSHELL 
320-22 (2d ed. 1986). 
210. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/2-622 (West 2003), invalidated by Best v. 
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2002); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000). 
211. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.682. 
212. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/2-622. 
213. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27. 
214. MINN. STAT. § 145.682. 
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deviated from the applicable standard of care and by that action 
caused injury to the plaintiff.215 
However, if the statute of limitations made it unreasonable to 
acquire the affidavit before filing suit, the plaintiff has ninety days 
from the date of service of the summons and complaint to serve the 
affidavit on the defendant or the defendant's counsel.216 The sec­
ond affidavit is an identification of the experts who will be called to 
testify, what they will say, and a summation of how they arrived at 
that conclusion.217 
Subdivision 6 of the statute addresses the penalties for non­
compliance.218 It states that failure to submit the first affidavit 
"within 60 days after demand for the affidavit results, upon motion, 
in mandatory dismissal with prejudice of each cause of action as to 
which expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie 
case."219 Similarly, if the plaintiff fails to file the second affidavit, 
the defendant can move for dismissal of all causes of action requir­
ing expert testimony to state a claim.220 However, the operation of 
this provision is limited by clause ( c), which states that if the second 
affidavit is submitted but is noncompliant due to "deficiencies in 
the affidavit," the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice as 
long as 
(1) the motion to dismiss the action identifies the claimed defi­
ciencies in the affidavit or answers to interrogatories; (2) the time 
for hearing the motion is at least 45 days from the date of service 
of the motion; and (3) before the hearing on the motion, the 
plaintiff does not serve upon the defendant an amended affidavit 
or answers to interrogatories that correct the claimed 
deficiencies.221 
Connecticut trial courts should be mindful of the safeguards 
contained in the Minnesota statute. Under that statute, there is lit­
tle risk of creating a trap for the unwary because failure to submit 
the first affidavit does not result in dismissal until sixty days have 
215. [d. § 145.682(3)(a). 
216. [d. § 145.682(3)(b). 
217. [d. § 145.682(4)(a). 
218. [d. § 145.682(6). 
219. [d. § 145.682(6)(a). 
220. [d. § 145.682(6)(b). 
221. [d. § 145.682(6)(c). The danger posed by section 52-190a is that an unsophis­
ticated, honestly injured litigant filing a medical malpractice action may be unaware of 
the statute. A demand requirement quells this danger, as dismissal cannot occur until 
the plaintiff has at least been made aware of this requirement. 
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passed since the demand.222 This statute ensures that the plaintiff is 
aware of the affidavit requirement. Although there have been con­
troversies surrounding the interpretation of the statute,223 the stat­
ute is effective at permitting meritorious yet procedurally deficient 
claims to proceed to trial. This fact alone demonstrates the stat­
ute's superiority to Connecticut's statute when it is interpreted as 
requiring certification as a prerequisite to subject matter 
jurisdiction.224 
2. Illinois 
Illinois's certificate of merit statute, before it was found uncon­
stitutional, contained language identical to that used in Connecti­
cut.225 The statute stated that "the failure [of the plaintiff] to file a 
certificate required by this Section shall be grounds for dismissal 
under Section 2-619."226 In holding that this language does not 
mandate dismissal with prejudice for failure to include the required 
affidavit, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that to hold conversely 
"would be a triumph of form over substance. It would elevate a 
pleading requirement designed to reduce frivolous lawsuits into a 
substantive defense forever barring plaintiffs who initially fail to 
comply with its terms."227 
In concluding, the court noted that the trial court has the dis­
cretion to grant leave to amend the complaint.228 This approach 
strikes the balance toward which Connecticut should strive. Instead 
of creating a hard and fast rule, the Illinois legislature gave Illinois 
trial courts the discretion to determine whether a complaint should 
222. Id. § 145.682(6). 
223. See generally Jason Leo, Torts-Medical Malpractice: The Legislature's At­
tempt to Prevent Cases Without Merit Denies Valid Claims, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1399, 1406 (2000). 
224. The fact that Minnesota included a demand requirement is telling. Though 
they have specified a harsh remedy, it will not be imposed until the plaintiff is at least 
aware of the statutory requirements. Although the Connecticut courts would be unable 
to read a demand requirement into the statute, allowing amendment of procedurally 
deficient complaints would have the same effect. It would ensure that no claims are 
dismissed at least until the plaintiff is aware that documentation is needed. 
225. 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/2-622 (West 2003), invalidated by Best V. Taylor 
Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). 
226. Id. 
227. McCasUe V. Sheinkop, 520 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ill. 1988). 
228. Id. 
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be dismissed,229 or whether leave to amend should be granted.23o 
Connecticut trial courts should be given the same discretion. 
3. New Jersey 
The New Jersey affidavit of merit statute has caused a great 
deal of confusion and has resulted in the dismissal of many merito­
rious c1aims.231 Interpreting Connecticut's statute in the same man­
ner that the New Jersey trial courts have interpreted New Jersey's 
will result in similar problems. Rather than going down this road, 
Connecticut courts should learn from the problems New Jersey 
courts confronted in interpreting the statute of their state. 
The New Jersey statute reads: 
In any action for damages ... resulting from an alleged act of 
malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession 
or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the 
date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, 
provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate li­
censed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the 
care, skill, or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, 
practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside 
acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment 
practices. The court may grant no more than one additional pe­
riod, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this 
section, upon a finding of good cause.232 
If a plaintiff fails to provide. the required documentation, "it shall 
be deemed a failure to state a cause of action. "233 
Critics argued that although this statute was intended to iden­
tify and dismiss frivolous malpractice cases, it "has evolved into a 
deathtrap for the unwary and has resulted in a tidal wave of contra­
dictory decisions by the trial and appellate courtS."234 New Jersey 
courts have strictly construed the statutory requirements, dismissing 
229. Illinois courts also can choose whether the claim should be dismissed with 
prejudice. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. Brown, supra note 100, at 427 (discussing the dismissal of valid claims). 
232. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000). 
233. /d. § 2A:53A-29. This circumstance results in the dismissal of the plaintiff's 
complaint with prejudice "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances." Cornblatt v. Barow, 
708 A.2d 401, 415 (N.J. 1998). 
234. Brown, supra note 100, at 427; see also Stroub, supra note 100, at 279 (noting 
that this statute has operated as a protocol minefield). Stroub also enumerates a num­
ber of cases that have been dismissed as a result of "technical non-compliance." Stroub, 
supra note 100, at 302-03. 
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complaints for the slightest deficiencies in the affidavit of merit.235 
For example, in Medeiros v. O'Donnell & Naccarato, Inc., the trial 
court dismissed the case with prejudice because the affidavit re­
ferred to the engineering firm as the "defendant," rather than using 
its name, as the statute prescribed.236 Though the Appellate Divi­
sion of the Superior Court reversed using the doctrine of substantial 
compliance,237 this is still problematic. 
Dismissal of potentially meritorious claims for the slightest 
procedural defects is bad policy.238 It inhibits a citizen's access to 
justice and undermines the goals of the tort system. A court should 
not have to resort to the substantial compliance doctrine to save 
claims such as these. Furthermore, it is certainly possible, if not 
likely, that similarly meritorious cases have been dismissed and 
were not revived by substantial compliance.239 Likewise it is impos­
sible to determine "how many defendants have used the affidavit of 
merit statute as a shield and a sword, being relieved from potential 
liability by motioning to dismiss cases against them based on that 
technical noncompliance. "240 Interpreting Connecticut's certificate 
of merit statute liberally will allow the trial courts to bypass these 
issues. As was seen in New Jersey,241 such an interpretation is per­
fectly valid. 
CONCLUSION 
Connecticut trial courts have borne the brunt of the Connecti­
cut legislature's sloppy drafting. In the wake of the 2005 amend­
ments to section 52-190a, Connecticut trial courts are divided. 
Since further legislative guidance will likely not be forthcoming, the 
courts will be forced to interpret the language as it currently is writ­
ten. The language and legislative history show that the Connecticut 
legislature intended for courts to adopt a liberal interpretation of 
this statute, giving judges discretion to order amendment of defi­
cient claims. However, this is only part of the story. Examination 
of public policy shows that a rigid interpretation of section 52-190a 
is imprudent. 
235. See Medeiros v. O'Donnell & Naccarato, Inc., 790 A.2d 969, 970 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
236. Id. at 97l. 
237. Id. at 973-74. 
238. See Greer v. Norbert, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 806, 807 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(quoting Evans v. Gen. Motors Corp., 893 A.2d 371, 387 (Conn. 2006)). 
239. Stroub, supra note 100, at 302-03. 
240. Id. at 303. 
241. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000). 
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Society loses when claims are decided on procedural grounds 
and litigants are denied their day in court. Our society values ac­
cess to the courts. In fact, there are constitutional provisions in 
most states requiring it. Yet, a rigid interpretation of section 52­
190a would eviscerate this cherished right. The costs of obtaining 
an opinion from a medical professional make it exceedingly difficult 
for low-income plaintiffs to have their cases decided on the merits. 
Further, the rising costs of medical malpractice lawsuits make attor­
neys reluctant to accept low-value claims. This forces many injured 
parties to litigate pro se, ignorant of the rules, and without an attor­
ney to guide them through what has been described as a procedural 
minefield.242 If Connecticut courts are serious about ensuring that 
disputes are decided on their merits and that all individuals have 
access to the courts, a liberal interpretation of section 52-190a 
should be adopted. 
Connecticut would be wise to learn from the experiences of 
other states. New Jersey's affidavit of merit statute has sparked a 
great deal of litigation and has resulted in the dismissal of many 
claims. Eventually, the New Jersey courts had to adopt the substan­
tial compliance doctrine to save meritorious complaints and amelio­
rate the havoc this statute was wreaking on their medical 
malpractice system. 
While not a picture of perfection, Minnesota's affidavit of 
merit statute helps to protect unsophisticated litigants. The de­
mand requirement ensures that litigants are aware of the need to 
procure affidavits of merit to prevent dismissal of their claims. By 
allowing amendment of procedurally defective complaints, Con­
necticut trial courts can achieve the same effect. 
Such an interpretation has been reached by Illinois in the face 
of virtually identical language. In noting the disastrous implications 
of a rigid interpretation, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a rule 
that allows the trial courts to determine whether leave to amend 
should be granted. Adopting such a rule in Connecticut would pre­
vent frivolous lawsuits from proceeding, while simultaneously en­
suring that meritorious-yet temporarily procedurally deficient­
complaints may proceed. This should be the goal of any state's 
rules of procedure. 
Brett f. Blank 
242. See Stroub, supra note 100, at 279. 
